Musings on External Goods

Prosperity and leisure are two states which can be either ethically praiseworthy or not. When the natural outcome or result of an agent's behavior, they properly attract praise. As such, they are more to be desired than the mere makaria to which they devolve when the result of tuche. But even then, prosperity and leisure are mere markers of the behavior (and, more fundamentally, the intentional state/character of the agent underlying the behavior). They are, however, natural markers of the makar (as a subset of the eudaimon); they reciprocally flow from, and allow for, the fullest expression or instantiation of the aretai. Considered from this perspective, it is (potentially dangerously) misleading to dismiss them as external goods in the pejorative sense often seen in the philosophical literature. Though not ethically significant per se, it is important to remember that precious few concepts are relevant per se - the worth of ethical thought arises from applied relations. Ethical theory is a derivative of applied ethics, not vice versa.

Thoughts on education and civics, part 4

Here's the fourth installment of the series I began in my post on March 2, and have continued here and here. As previously, it should be read as a continuation of the same overall essay. Comments welcome, of course.

We must, then, consider the possibility that it is the government which is (or at least should be) both competent and empowered to distribute educational resources to students in ways which maximize the good of the society. Such, for example, might be a system of 'tracking', in which, responsive to performance on standardized tests, students are assigned to sequences of courses designed to match and strengthen their aptitudes as demonstrated on said tests. Thus, in principle, students whose natural proclivities and skill sets are generally well suited to successful, productive, and satisfying engagement in, say, the legal profession will receive an educational experience tailored to this specific set of characteristics, and will be spared the wasted time and frustration of struggling through irrelevant classes. The government will be spared the wasted expense, supplying exactly the right education to the students who will most benefit from it, without paying for future artists to take trigonometry or future physicians to take computer-aided drafting. Students will, at a younger age, experience the camaraderie of like-minded and -talented peers, benefiting from cooperation and competition with fellows who are striving for similar goals and whose interests coincide closely with their own. Such homogeneous grouping will also allow for inculcation of a sense of the value of the particular vocation or pursuit particular to the group. Thus, the apparent second option, its features and consequences.

Dido and Aeneas in space

As seen today on nytimes.com:

‘LA DIDONE’ In previews; opens on Sunday. The Wooster Group melds Baroque opera with a Mario Bava sci-fi film in its new mash-up. Elizabeth LeCompte directs (1:35). St. Ann’s Warehouse, 38 Water Street, Dumbo, Brooklyn, (718) 254-8779.

I don't think I need to say anything more.

A new paradigm in ethical thought?

"The End of Philosophy" by David Brooks, in Monday's New York Times. (Nicely playing with the double sense of "end" common in philosophical contexts...) Proposing an emotion-based, rather than "hyper-rational" methodology for making ethical decisions, without thereby devolving into a mere preference-based approach.

Thoughts on education and civics, part 3

Here's the third installment of the series I began in my post on March 2, and continued on March 14. It should be read as a continuation of the same overall essay.


And so, we posit that the government is obliged to provide an education which is responsive to the various diversities of its population. Let us ignore, for the sake of argument, the very real pragmatic problems one might raise here (paying for such a program, for instance). Even assuming that a civil government is fully able to fund and staff such a system of education, nothing can come of it until a central question is answered: who is empowered, and competent, to decide which students receive which education, among they myriad possibilities? Society as a whole (in practical terms, this means the representatives of the government), or individuals? Our intuitive, reflexive response is toward the latter: only parents, teachers, and the students themselves have the relevant knowledge to make appropriate choices for individual students' education. But by appealing to such justification, we have surreptitiously changed our goals and our point of view. Up to now, recall, we have been constructing our hypothetical educational system based on considering the needs of civil society, not of individuals. Parents and students may indeed be the most competent judges of what education is best for individual students. But are they at all competent to determine the needs of society as a whole? Does any given parent, teacher or student have the necessary knowledge, insight, or objectivity to recognize, analyze, predict, and privilege the elements required to provide society with the maximal pool of civically prepared citizens? Perhaps. Yet even if we grant it so, this conclusion rests on the prima facie unrealistic assumption that, in the immortal words, 'the good of the many' and 'the good of the few, or the one' will align. It is far too clear to anyone who has even a cursory knowledge of humanity that this assumption is unworkable.